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Introduction
In its 1954 decision, Remmer v. United States, the Supreme Court
declared that outside influences on jurors are “presumptively prejudicial.” 1 Although Remmer involved paradigmatic jury tampering,
extraneous contacts involving jurors—and juror misconduct more
broadly—comes in many forms. 2 Since Remmer, the internet and
electronic secondary sources have required courts to address extraneous
contact involving internet legal research and social media. 3 And,
although the Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment right
to an impartial jury against the states, remedies for extraneous contacts
involving jurors vary widely between jurisdictions.4
In the half-century following Remmer, although stopping short of
explicitly overruling Remmer, the Court cast doubt on the
presumption’s vitality, sowing widespread confusion among the lower
courts. 5 Further, states have adopted myriad procedures aimed at
remedying extraneous juror contacts.6 This variation likely stems from
confusion about where extraneous contact with a juror ends and juror
misconduct begins.7
A presumption that extraneous contacts are prejudicial is not a
minor, idiosyncratic difference between jurisdictions. As Justice
Brennan once noted, “[T]he assignment of the burden of proof on an
1.

Remmer v. United States (Remmer I), 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).

2.

See Bennett L. Gershman, Contaminating the Verdict: The Problem of
Juror Misconduct, 50 S.D. L. Rev. 322, 323–24 (2005), which explains:
“Defendants have claimed that jurors were [1] influenced by external contacts with third parties, [2] exposed to extraneous, nonevidentiary information, [3] engaged in contrived experiments and
improper reenactments in the jury room, [4] made dishonest and
misleading statements during jury selection, [5] engaged in conduct
demonstrating bias and prejudgment, [6] suffered from physical
and mental impairments, [7] engaged in pre-deliberation discussions
of the evidence, and [8] willfully violated the trial court’s legal
instructions.”
(footnotes omitted). But see infra text accompanying notes 176–77; infra
Part III(A) (explaining why extraneous contacts should not be treated as
juror misconduct). In this Note, “extraneous contact” means any contact
between a juror and extrajudicial influence pertaining to the matter for
which a juror is empaneled—the first two of Gershman’s above examples.

3.

See generally Amanda McGee, Comment, Juror Misconduct in the
Twenty-First Century: The Prevalence of the Internet and Its Effect on
American Courtrooms, 30 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 301, 307–14 (2010).

4.

See infra Part I(D)(1); infra Part II.

5.

See infra Part II.

6.

See infra Part III.

7.

See infra Part II.
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issue where evidence does not exist and cannot be obtained is outcome
determinative. [The] assignment of the burden is merely a way of
announcing a predetermined conclusion.”8 Extraneous contacts present
that precise problem. Evidence that a contact biased a juror is generally
unavailable due to the no-impeachment rule. Although the rule permits
testimony about whether an extraneous contact happened, it generally
excludes relevant information that might otherwise prove whether that
contact impacted deliberations.9 When the only fact either party can
prove is whether or not extraneous contact happened, rather than what
its effects were (i.e., whether a juror manifested bias during deliberation), the burdened party fails.
Put another way, the no-impeachment rule restricts evidence of
whether extraneous contacts influenced a jury’s verdict, exposing only
the proverbial tip of the iceberg. The question is whether to presume
until proven otherwise that what lies unseen below the water threatens
to sink the defendant’s impartial jury guarantee—or whether to sail
ahead under the assumption that no danger lurks beneath the waves,
in the interest of making good time.10
This Note examines the Supreme Court’s, federal circuits’, and
state courts’ approaches to remedying extraneous contacts. From those
disparate approaches, it attempts to formulate a uniform solution that
strikes a constitutionally sound balance between the impartial jury
guarantee and judicial efficiency. Part I examines the Supreme Court’s
extraneous-contact jurisprudence, the Sixth Amendment impartial-jury
guarantee’s incorporation, and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part II
surveys a three-way split between federal circuits, as well as the
patchwork of state approaches to extraneous contacts. Part III proposes
a procedure that courts should adopt when analyzing claims of extrinsic
juror bias. The proposed procedure strikes an appropriate balance
between the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and concerns
of judicial efficiency.

I.

The Law Governing Extraneous Juror Contacts

American colonists decried the Crown’s decision to deprive colonists
of their jury-trial right in the Declaration of Independence.11 While it is
unclear how frequently colonists were in fact denied a jury trial, the
8.

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 943 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(alternation in original) (quoting Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 Ind. L.J.
329, 332–33 (1973)).

9.

See infra Part I(D)(2).

10.

See generally Titanic (Paramount Pictures 1997).

11.

Sydney George Fisher, The Twenty-Eight Charges Against the King in the
Declaration of Independence, 31 Pa. Mag. Hist. & Biography 257, 288
(1907).
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Crown’s actions nevertheless inspired the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments.12 The Supreme Court later held that the right to trial by
impartial jury was so fundamental to our concept of ordered liberty
that it incorporated the right against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.13 Yet the Court’s approach to rooting out bias caused by
extraneous contacts has trended away from stalwartly protecting the
impartial-jury guarantee towards favoring finality. 14 Simultaneously,
the range of potential extraneous contacts has broadened, encompassing
everything from quintessential jury tampering15 to jurors researching
legal terms of art on Wikipedia.16 Regardless of how extraneous contact
happens, courts are concerned that extraneous contacts will affect a
juror’s ability to deliberate impartially.17
A.

Constitutional Impartial-Jury Requirements

The impartial-jury requirement appears in the Sixth Amendment’s
text, which ensures that criminal defendants “enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed.”18
Even one biased juror may deprive a defendant of her Sixth
Amendment right.19 But an impartial juror need not be “totally ignorant of the facts and issues” of the case for which she is empaneled.20
Rather, the Supreme Court has described impartiality as a state of

12.

See id. (noting some confusion regarding which acts of Parliament the
Declaration of Independence referred to).

13.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968); see infra Part I(D)(1).

14.

Compare Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150 (1892) (“Private
communications . . . between jurors and third persons . . . invalidate
the verdict, . . . unless their harmlessness is made to appear.”), with
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (“[D]ue process does not require
a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally
acceptable.”).

15.

E.g., Remmer I, 347 U.S. 227, 228.

16.

E.g., United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 639 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying
Remmer to a juror who “research[ed] on Wikipedia the term ‘sponsor,’ an
element of the crimes charged”).

17.

See generally Sarah N. Welling, 3 Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 587 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2021 & Supp. Jan. 2022)
for background.

18.

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

19.

Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 944 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Morgan v.
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992)).

20.

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
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indifference that must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.21 The Court
recognized as early as 1963 that “widespread and diverse methods of
communication” ensure that well-informed prospective jurors inevitably
have some sort of opinion or impression about the case for which they
are called.22 To avoid an impossible standard, it is enough that a juror
can set aside any preconceived notions and “render a verdict based on
the evidence presented in court.”23
Unlike criminal defendants, whose impartial-jury right is rooted in
the Sixth Amendment, civil litigants’ right to a jury trial is found in
the Seventh Amendment.24 Although the Seventh Amendment does not
explicitly guarantee an “impartial” jury, courts have consistently found
that the Seventh and Fifth Amendments require impartial juries in civil
trials.25 Although courts have occasionally applied Remmer’s holding to
civil proceedings,26 this Note will focus on Remmer’s primary application: protecting criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury.
B.

Early Caselaw: Burr and Mattox

While riding circuit in 1807, Chief Justice Marshall had an early
opportunity to define the impartial jury guarantee in United States v.
Burr.27 Aaron Burr’s attorneys sought to prevent potential jurors from
being empaneled. They argued that “inflammatory articles” about
21.

United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145–46 (1936) (“Impartiality is not
a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this
mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down
no particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and
artificial formula.”).

22.

Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722.

23.

Id. at 723. This has been the impartial-jury standard since the early 19th
century. Id. at 722. And every state constitution preserved the jury-trial
right for criminal defendants accused of serious crimes even before the
Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment impartial-jury right
against the states. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).

24.

U.S. Const. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.”).

25.

James J. Gobert, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 269, 269 n.1 (1988).

26.

E.g., Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977) (requiring a Remmer
hearing after allegations of jury tampering in a § 1983 proceeding).

27.

25 F. Cas. 49, 52 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g). This was a companion
case to United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,694), in which Aaron Burr stood trial for treason. See generally
Morrison Shafroth, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, 18 A.B.A. J. 669 (1932)
(explaining the surrounding circumstances).
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Burr’s conduct had biased the jurors against him.28 Marshall explained
the practical difficulties of empaneling a truly impartial jury in
particularly high-profile cases.29 “[L]ight impressions,” therefore, were
permissible—but “strong and deep impressions” that could not yield to
evidence at trial were not.30 Further, whether a party could challenge a
potential juror’s impartiality depended on whether the impression
pertained to a case’s dispositive element.31 Burr’s attorneys could therefore challenge only those jurors who “ha[d] made up and delivered the
opinion that [Burr] entertained the treasonable designs with which he
[was] charged, and that he retained those designs and was prosecuting
them when the act charged in the indictment is alleged to have been
committed . . . .”32 Chief Justice Marshall’s Burr decision exemplifies
the tension between guaranteeing a perfectly impartial jury and
empaneling imperfect human jurors.33 But while Burr instructed courts
how to root out bias before empaneling jurors, it did not deal with bias
as a result of extraneous contacts with already-empaneled jurors.
Nearly a century after Burr, the Court foreshadowed its Remmer
rule in Mattox v. United States.34 Clyde Mattox stood trial for murder.35
During deliberations, the bailiff provided extrajudicial information to
the jury. The bailiff told jurors that Mattox would stand trial again on
different charges after it returned its verdict—and that his alleged
victim was the third person Mattox had killed.36 Further, the jury was
read an excerpt from an article in a local newspaper, which opined that
“[i]f [Mattox was] not found guilty of murder he [would] be a lucky
man” because of the “very strong” evidence against him.37
Chief Justice Fuller articulated a rule that foreshadowed Remmer’s
“presumptively prejudicial” doctrine: “Private communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or the
28.

Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 49.

29.

Id. at 50–51.

30.

Id. at 51.

31.

Id. (“[T]o say that any man who had formed an opinion on any fact
conducive to the final decision of the case would therefore be considered
as disqualified from serving on the jury, would exclude intelligent and
observing men . . . .”).

32.

Id. at 52.

33.

See id. at 50–51. (“Were it possible to obtain a jury without any
prepossessions whatever respecting the guilt or innocence of the accused,
it would be extremely desirable to obtain such a jury; but this is perhaps
impossible, and therefore will not be required.”).

34.

146 U.S. 140 (1892).

35.

Id. at 141.

36.

Id. at 142.

37.

Id. at 143.
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officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict,
at least unless their harmlessness is made to appear.”38 Because the
Mattox Court specified that the default response to extraneous contacts
is a mistrial, it implicitly burdened the government to prove the “harmlessness” of “possibly prejudicial” contact with jurors.
Burr and Mattox laid the doctrinal groundwork for Remmer’s
procedural solution. Burr defined the Sixth Amendment impartial-jury
right. And Mattox burdened the government to prove that any improper extrinsic influence on jurors is not prejudicial.
C.

Presuming Prejudice: Remmer

Another half-century later, the Court prescribed the procedural
remedy for extraneous contacts. Namely, an evidentiary hearing, at
which the government bears a heavy burden to rebut a presumption
that extraneous contacts prejudiced the defendant.
1.

The Trial of Bones Remmer

Elmer “Bones” Remmer, a money launderer for organized crime in
the western United States,39 stood trial in San Francisco from late 1951
through early 1952 for tax evasion.40 Sometime during the trial, James
Satterly, a Las Vegas craps dealer, approached I.J. Smith—one of the
jurors—and remarked that Smith “could profit by bringing in a
favorable verdict” for Remmer.41 After learning of Satterly’s comments,
the judge conferred with the prosecuting attorneys and contacted the
FBI. 42 The FBI’s investigation—which included interviewing Smith
while the trial was ongoing—concluded that Satterly had made the
statement in jest. 43 But defense counsel did not learn about the
extraneous contact, let alone that the FBI had investigated it, until
they read newspapers’ coverage of the trial—after the jury had already
convicted Remmer.44
Remmer moved for a new trial and requested that the district court
hold a hearing to determine whether the bribe offer and subsequent FBI
investigation had affected the jury’s impartiality.45 The district court
38.

Id. at 150.

39.

Paul Drexler, Elmer ‘Bones’ Remmer: San Francisco’s Gambling Czar, S.F.
Exam’r (Nov. 20, 2016 12:00 AM), https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/
elmer-bones-remmer-san-franciscos-gambling-czar [https://perma.cc/V3MMBQVQ].

40.

Remmer I, 347 U.S. 227, 228 (1954).

41.

Transcript of Record at 3–4, Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227
(1954) (No. 12,177).

42.

Remmer I, 347 U.S. at 228.

43.

Id.

44.

Transcript of Record, supra note 41, at 4.

45.

Remmer I, 347 U.S. at 228.
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denied the motion and refused the hearing request.46 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling because Remmer had not shown that
the contact between Satterly and Smith had produced prejudice.47
The Supreme Court vacated Remmer’s conviction and remanded to
the district court, instructing the trial judge to hold a hearing to
determine whether Satterly’s comments had biased the jury. 48 The
Remmer Court explicitly rejected burdening the defendant to show
prejudice, explaining:
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or
tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about
the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed
presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules
of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made
during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The
presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon
the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the
defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the
defendant.49

The district court was instructed “to hold a hearing to determine
whether the incident complained of was harmful to the petitioner” and,
if so, “to grant a new trial.”50
On remand, the district court limited its inquiry to whether the
FBI investigation had prejudiced the jury deliberations.51 But when the
case returned to the Supreme Court two years later, the Court
explained that the district court should have examined “the entire
picture,” including Satterly’s communications with Smith.52
The entire picture, as it turned out, was troubling. Satterly’s
comments had “disturbed” Smith. 53 Further, Smith had discussed
Slattery’s offer and the “terrific pressure” he felt to two other jurors.54
Smith also did not know the FBI investigation’s findings when casting
46.

Id. at 229.

47.

Id.

48.

Id. at 230.

49.

Id. at 229 (emphasis added).

50.

Id. at 230.

51.

Remmer v. United States (Remmer II), 350 U.S. 377, 378 (1956).

52.

Id. at 379; see also Remmer I, 347 U.S. at 230 (“We therefore vacate the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District
Court with directions to hold a hearing to determine whether the incident
complained of was harmful to the petitioner, and if after hearing it is
found to have been harmful, to grant a new trial.”).

53.

Remmer II, 350 U.S. at 380.

54.

Id. at 381.
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his vote to convict Remmer.55 And, as Remmer’s attorneys pointed out,
the conversation with Satterly may have given Smith pause about
voting to acquit. 56 Taken together, the Court determined that the
extraneous contact had biased Smith.57 Remmer was entitled to a new
trial.58
2.

Remmer’s Presumption

The Remmer Court deemed extraneous contact involving a juror
“presumptively prejudicial.” 59 But Remmer did little to clarify that
presumption’s precise nature—and courts have contributed to the
confusion by incautiously interpreting Remmer’s holding.60
As a preliminary matter, the Remmer Court omitted a key
intermediate premise from the rule it articulated. The extraneous
contact does not presumptively prejudice the defendant. Instead, the
contact presumptively biases the juror—by altering the juror’s opinion
of the defendant, knowledge of the case’s facts, or understanding of the
applicable legal standard. The presumption is that the juror, once
exposed to extraneous contacts, will not be able to “render a verdict
based on evidence presented in court” as required by the impartial jury
guarantee.61 That biased juror, then, prejudices the proceedings because
he can no longer deliberate impartially using only the record generated
at trial.62
Generally speaking, a presumption’s character and constitutionality
depend on the presumption’s context. 63 In the criminal context, a
presumption burdening the defendant raises constitutional concerns if
it allows the jury to presume a crime’s element is satisfied, rather than
require the prosecution to prove each element beyond a reasonable
55.

Id. at 381–82.

56.

Transcript of Record, supra note 41, at 4 (“Smith, having had such
conversation, quite naturally would be apprehensive of being suspected
and criticized were he to vote and attempt to have the other jurors vote
for a verdict in favor of the defendant . . . .”).

57.

Remmer II, 350 U.S. at 381 (“We think this evidence, covering the total
picture, reveals such a state of facts that neither Mr. Smith nor anyone
else could say that he was not affected in his freedom of action as a
juror.”).

58.

Id. at 382.

59.

Remmer I, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).

60.

See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982) (stating—contrary
to Remmer’s text—that Remmer placed the burden on the defendant to
prove bias).

61.

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).

62.

See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text.

63.

Compare Fed. R. Evid. 301, with Ulster Cnty. Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140
(1979).
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doubt.64 But because an evidentiary hearing investigating an extraneous
contact does not determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence—and the
presumption is against the government, rather than the defendant—no
such concern exists in the Remmer-hearing context.
Yet the usual civil-context presumption (a “bursting bubble”
presumption)—which would allow the government to rebut the presumption simply by producing any evidence that the defendant was not
prejudiced—is inappropriate in this context. 65 Remmer was explicit
that “the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish . . .
that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.”66
Instead, the Court probably contemplated a presumption that
assigns not only a burden of production, but also a burden of
persuasion.67 Presumptions that assign a burden of persuasion typically
arise when strong policy underpinnings—including evidence’s unavailability and social policy—render a “bursting bubble” presumption
inadequate.68 In the Remmer-hearing context, the no-impeachment rule
renders evidence that deliberations were biased unavailable.69 Further,
Remmer’s presumption serves an unquestionably important policy
concern: a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment impartial-jury
guarantee. It is not clear what evidentiary standard the Remmer Court
intended to require of the government to rebut a presumption of
prejudice. But that the Court characterized the burden as “rest[ing]
heavily”70 certainly rules out anything less than a preponderance of the
evidence71—and likely implies an even more demanding standard.72
64.

Allen, 442 U.S. at 157.

65.

See 2 Kenneth S. Broun, George E. Dix, Edward J. Imwinkelried,
David H. Kaye & Eleanor Swift, McCormick on Evidence § 344,
at 741–51 (Robert P. Mosteller ed., 8th ed. 2020) (discussing the “bursting
bubble” theory of presumption and critiques thereof); see also Fed. R.
Evid. 301.

66.

Remmer I, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).

67.

Broun et al., supra note 65, at 751.

68.

See id. at 743–44 (“The strong policies behind [certain] presumption[s] are
so apparent that the courts have universally agreed that the party . . .
[rebutting the presumption] not only has the burden of producing evidence
in support of the contention, but also has a heavy burden of persuasion
on the issue as well.”).

69.

See infra Part I(D)(2).

70.

Remmer I, 347 U.S. at 229.

71.

Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167–68 (1986) (determining that
the “‘heavy’ burden” imposed on the government to show that a defendant
has waived her Miranda rights may be satisfied by a preponderance of the
evidence).

72.

See Commonwealth v. Guisti, 747 N.E.2d 673, 680 (Mass. 2001) (requiring
the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that extraneous contact did not prejudice the defendant).
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D.

Incorporation, Impeachment, and Efficiency

Remmer was decided on the cusp of a watershed period in American
law. That shifting legal landscape may explain why the Court apparently departed from Remmer’s presumption. Three developments are
especially relevant: the Supreme Court incorporated the impartial-jury
guarantee to the states; Congress enacted the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which codified the no-impeachment rule; and the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts emphasized judicial efficiency and finality, calling
into question the Remmer presumption’s continuing vitality.
1.

Incorporation

Just over a decade after deciding Remmer II, the Court
incorporated the impartial-jury guarantee against the states in Duncan
v. Louisiana.73 The Court traced the long history of the jury trial back
to the Magna Carta, and determined that the right to an impartial jury
was so fundamental and firmly rooted in American jurisprudence that
substantive due process incorporated it against the states. 74 But
although the Court recognized that the right to an impartial jury is
fundamental, the procedures ensuring that right vary widely between
jurisdictions.75 That variation merits skepticism—the Court has time
and again rejected a “watered-down, subjective” application of fundamental rights incorporated through substantive due process.76 Further,
in the collateral-appeal context some circuits even consider a state
court’s failure to apply Remmer’s presumption an unreasonable
application of federal law.77 A uniform Remmer procedure is therefore
necessary to ensure that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee is truly
incorporated against the states.

73.

391 U.S. 145 (1968).

74.

Id. at 151–54.

75.

See infra Part II.

76.

See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 (2010) (quoting
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964)).

77.

E.g., Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2014). But on
collateral appeal, the petitioner must prove that failing to apply the
presumption resulted in actual prejudice. Id. at 252–53 (citing Hall v.
Zenk, 692 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2012). But see B. Samantha Helgason, Note,
Opening Pandora’s Jury Box, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 231, 259–60 (2020)
(cataloging disparate collateral-appeal approaches between circuits).
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2.

The No-Impeachment Rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), and
Tanner

The Remmer presumption is inextricably linked with the noimpeachment rule,78 which prohibits jurors from testifying about their
deliberations.79 The rule dates to 1785, when Lord Mansfield ruled that
a juror could not submit an affidavit alleging juror misconduct. 80
“Mansfield’s Rule” was widely adopted and settled by 1975, when
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence. 81 Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b) codified this common-law rule.82 The Senate Judiciary
Committee report explained that Rule 606(b) provides “finality” and
the “absolute privacy” of jurors.83 Although Rule 606(b) preserved the
common-law exception that permits jurors to testify about improper
extraneous contacts,84 it still excludes testimony about whether those
contacts actually affected a jury’s deliberations.85
The Supreme Court echoed the judiciary committee’s rationales in
Tanner v. United States.86 In Tanner, two jurors separately alleged that
78.

See, e.g., Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, passim (2017)
(referring to the exclusion of juror testimony regarding deliberations as
the “no-impeachment rule”).

79.

See generally 3 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Federal Evidence § 6:16 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated May
2021) (describing the scope, origins, and policy considerations for the noimpeachment rule).

80.

Andrew J. Hull, Unearthing Mansfield’s Rule: Analyzing the
Appropriateness of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) in Light of the
Common Law Tradition, 38 S. Ill. U. L.J. 403, 406 (2014).

81.

Id. at 406–07.

82.

Id. at 406; see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 121 (1987).

83.

Hull, supra note 80, at 407 (quoting S. Rep. No. 93-1277, at 13–14
(1974)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 606 note (Subdivision (b)) (“The values
sought to be promoted by excluding the evidence include freedom of
deliberation, stability and finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors
against annoyance and embarrassment. . . . On the other hand, simply
putting verdicts beyond effective reach can only promote irregularity and
injustice. The rule offers an accommodation between these competing
considerations.”).

84.

Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) includes the Mattox exception, which
allows jurors to testify about extraneous contacts. Tanner, 483 U.S. at
121.

85.

See, e.g., Defendants’ Joint Post-Remmer Hearing Brief in Support of
Ordering a New Trial, Exhibit 1 - Redacted Transcript at 43, United
States v. Lanier, No. 2:14-cr-00083, 2016 WL 6819998 (E.D. Tenn. Oct.
24, 2016). The trial court admonished the defense attorney that 606(b)
precluded asking a juror “about what happened in deliberations or what
[the juror at issue] said in deliberations or what other people said [in
deliberations].” Id.

86.

Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120.
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jurors were consuming alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during recesses.87
But the Court refused to carve out an exception to Rule 606(b).
Permitting juror testimony about deliberations, it reasoned, would
result in jurors being “harassed and beset” by criminal defendants,
thereby “destr[oying] all frankness and freedom” during deliberations.88
So the possibility of subsequent investigations into deliberations,
according to the Court, was not unlike the “unauthorized invasion”
Remmer sought to remedy. 89 Further, the Court noted that jurormisconduct allegations raised “days, weeks, or months after the verdict”
threatened to “seriously disrupt the [verdict’s] finality.”90
The Tanner Court emphasized an “external/internal distinction,”
differentiating internal juror misconduct—like the drug and alcohol
abuse at issue—from extraneous contacts.91 Courts may admit evidence
that extraneous contacts took place, but not evidence of contacts’
impact on deliberations. 92 Any juror testimony evidencing how the
jurors deliberated is inadmissible.93 Still, Rule 606(b), like the commonlaw no-impeachment rule, does not prohibit juror testimony
“concerning any mental bias in matters unrelated to the specific issues
that the juror was called to decide.”94
A juror can therefore testify, for example, that her extrajudicial
discovery of a defendant’s prior convictions compromised her
impartiality.95 But she could not testify that she shared that knowledge
with other jurors during deliberations or how that knowledge affected
the ultimate verdict. And if the extraneous contact involved information directly related to the issues before the jury, she could not
testify whether it biased her.96 Defendants tasked with proving actual
87.

Id. at 113–16.

88.

Id. at 119–20 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267–68 (1915)).

89.

Id. at 120 (quoting Remmer I, 347 U.S. 227, 335 (1954)).

90.

Id.

91.

Id. at 117.

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120–21 & 121 n.5 (1983).

95.

See id.

96.

In practice, courts do not always carefully adhere to this rule. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2008). In Wheaton, a
juror used his laptop to determine the relative distance between two
locations relevant to the case. Id. at 359. In open court, the judge “asked
the jury whether the use of the juror’s computer had in any way affected
anyone’s decisionmaking, and the jurors responded by shaking their heads
negatively.” Id. After admonishing the jury not to conduct independent
research, the judge “instructed the jury to continue with its
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bias therefore face a nearly impossible task.97 Even if a defendant is able
to inquire about mental bias unrelated to the issues before the jury, he
must rely only on the juror’s ability to self-diagnose—and willingness
to admit—whether she is biased or not. But recent scholarship indicates
that jurors are especially bad at this sort of self-diagnosis.98
The purpose of Remmer’s presumption is therefore to ensure that,
in a criminal proceeding, the government bears this nearly impossible
burden. Put another way, without the no-impeachment rule, there
would be little need for a presumption. Rather than stopping its
Remmer inquiry at whether the extraneous contact took place, the trial
court could admit evidence about how the jury reacted to the outside
influence. Courts could then evaluate problematic deliberations as they
would any other grounds for a new trial.99 But while eliminating the noimpeachment rule would result in a more uniform impartial-jury right,
it would reintroduce the problems that Lord Mansfield sought to
remedy nearly 250 years ago: infringing jurors’ privacy, threatening
their freedom to deliberate frankly, and undermining concerns of
finality. This Note therefore proposes a procedure consistent with these
policy considerations while protecting defendants’ right to an impartial
jury.
3.

Judicial Efficiency

Chief Justice Burger, appointed fifteen years after Remmer,
spearheaded a jurisprudential shift towards judicial efficiency and
finality.100 His administrative philosophy—which was largely inspired
by foreign court systems and hospital administration—abhorred
deliberations.” Id. The Sixth Circuit determined this was not an abuse of
the district court’s discretion and affirmed the defendant’s conviction. Id.
at 361–62. True enough, the Wheaton jurors did not offer testimony
governed by the Rules of Evidence—they were not sworn witnesses. But
the no-impeachment rule’s underlying policy concerns still apply. See also
infra Part II(B) (explaining that the Sixth Circuit is a jurisdiction that
treats extraneous contacts as juror misconduct).
97.

Several jurisdictions require an actual-bias showing. E.g., State v. Jenner,
780 S.E.2d 762, 773–74 (W. Va. 2015) (“[T]he person seeking a new trial
must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that improper influence on
a juror occurred and affected the verdict.”). Some jurisdictions have
therefore rejected a subjective actual-bias requirement in favor of an
objective hypothetical-reasonable-juror test. See infra notes 244–49.

98.

See David Yokum, Christopher T. Robertson & Matt Palmer, The
Inability to Self-Diagnose Bias, 96 Denv. L. Rev. 869, 913 (2018) (noting
that “jurors [in the study] completely failed to self-diagnose bias”).

99.

See infra Part II(C) (explaining that courts generally have significant
discretion when hearing motions for a new trial in contexts outside of
extraneous contacts involving jurors).

100. James A. Gazell, Chief Justice Burger’s Quest for Judicial Administrative
Efficiency, 1977 Det. Coll. L. Rev. 455, 455.
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congestion and promoted judicial efficiency.101 This shift helps explain
why Remmer’s presumption—which made a new (expensive) trial the
default remedy for extraneous contacts—fell out of favor.
Justice Rehnquist, who would succeed Burger, wholeheartedly
embraced this pivot towards judicial efficiency. In McDonough Power
Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 102 the Court grappled with another
manifestation of juror bias—failing to truthfully answer questions
during voir dire.103 Writing for the majority, then-Justice Rehnquist
reiterated that “there are no perfect trials.”104 He further emphasized
the cost to litigants, jurors, and taxpayers inherent in trying cases.105
Even if perfect trials were possible, he reasoned, limited resources and
increased caseloads would prevent courts from holding them. 106
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist explicitly disapproved of presuming
prejudice—a practice that he viewed as a relic of a bygone era when
“reviewing courts were considered ‘citadels of technicality.’”107
E.

Post-Incorporation Caselaw

Chief Justice Rehnquist presided over two cases that dealt with
extraneous juror contacts. This section examines these cases to better
understand why some lower courts have departed from Remmer, and
to formulate a more effective Remmer procedure.
1.

Smith v. Phillips

Although not the sole cause, some have blamed Smith v. Phillips
for courts’ departure from Remmer’s presumption.108 William Phillips
was convicted of murder.109 During Phillips’s trial, one of the jurors
applied to be a “major felony investigator in the District Attorney’s
Office.”110 Despite initially concealing the juror’s application from the

101. Id. at 456–61.
102. 464 U.S. 548 (1984).
103. Id. at 549–50.
104. Id. at 553 (quoting Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 232 (1973)).
105. Id. at 553, 555.
106. Id. at 553.
107. Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946)).
108. Eva Kerr, Note, Prejudice, Procedure, and a Proper Presumption:
Restoring the Remmer Presumption of Prejudice in Order to Protect
Criminal Defendants’ Sixth Amendment Rights, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 1451,
1460 (2008) (“Smith has generated confusion among the federal courts of
appeals as to whether the Remmer presumption of prejudice remains
valid.”).
109. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 210.
110. Id. at 212.
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trial court, prosecutors eventually disclosed it. 111 The trial judge
determined that the application did not warrant a mistrial, and the
jury convicted Phillips.112 On federal collateral appeal, the district court
“ordered [him] released unless the State granted him a new trial within
90 days,” and the Second Circuit affirmed.113
The Supreme Court reversed. 114 Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained that trial courts do not need to grant a
mistrial “every time a juror has been placed in a potentially
compromising situation.” 115 Although he did not cite Burr directly,
Rehnquist’s discussion of the inherently impossible nature of a perfectly
impartial jury tracked much of Marshall’s reasoning. 116 Somewhat
perplexingly, Rehnquist wrote that “[t]his Court has long held that the
remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the
defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias,” citing Remmer as
support.117 But the Remmer Court did not burden the defendant with
“prov[ing] actual bias”—it placed “the burden . . . heavily upon the
Government to establish . . . that [extraneous] contact with the juror
was harmless to the defendant.”118 The resulting disparity between the
Remmer Court’s presumption of prejudice and the Phillips Court’s
implied burden on the defendant to prove prejudice led to confusion

111. Id. at 213.
112. Id. at 213–14.
113. Id. at 214.
114. Id. at 221.
115. Id. at 217.
116. Id.; see supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text. Justice Rehnquist
explained:
Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable.
The safeguards of juror impartiality, such as voir dire and
protective instructions from the trial judge, are not infallible; it is
virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or
influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Due process
means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the
evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent
prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen. Such determinations may properly be
made at a hearing like that ordered in Remmer and held in this
case.
Phillips, 455 U.S. at 217.
117. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215 (emphasis added) (citing Remmer I, 347 U.S. 227
(1954)).
118. Remmer I, 347 U.S. at 229 (emphasis added). The Phillips opinion quoted
heavily from Remmer I but failed to include this language. See Phillips,
455 U.S. at 215–16.
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about Remmer’s continuing vitality—with two circuits abandoning the
presumption entirely.119
Phillips also raised questions about when Remmer applies. Remmer
and Mattox both dealt with third-party-initiated extraneous contacts
that pertained to the case for which the juror was empaneled.120 But
Phillips dealt with an extraneous contact that the juror initiated.121
Moreover, Phillips did not turn on whether the juror-initiated contact
exposed the juror to information that likely biased him. Instead, the
Court considered whether the juror’s law-enforcement job application
demonstrated that the juror was impliedly biased, despite the juror’s
claim that he remained unbiased.122 It was the juror’s intrinsic quality—
his interest in law enforcement—that the defendant argued manifested
bias. 123 That the Phillips Court invoked Remmer in this context is
especially perplexing given that Remmer constrained its prescription to
contacts “about the matter pending before the jury.” 124 Nothing in
Phillips indicates that the juror’s job application fit this description.
Rather, the defendant’s theory was that the job application manifested
the juror’s implied bias favoring law enforcement.125 It therefore made
little sense to invoke Remmer—which dealt with contacts that caused
jurors’ biases.
The Phillips Court’s decision caused widespread confusion, leading
two circuits to reject Remmer’s presumption of prejudice outright, and
leading other circuits to question Remmer’s continued vitality.126
2.

United States v. Olano

Recent scholarship, 127 and some court decisions 128 characterize
United States v. Olano129 as the Court’s most recent decision regarding
the proper response to extraneous contacts. But Olano’s treatment of
119. Helgason, supra note 77, at 249; see also infra Part II(B) (discussing the
Sixth and Tenth Circuits’ rejections of Remmer).
120. See supra Parts I(A)–(C).
121. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 212–13.
122. Id. at 215.
123. Id. at 222 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that certain qualities or
affiliations may lead courts to find that a juror is impliedly biased).
124. Remmer I, 347 U.S. 227, 229; see also Phillips, 455 U.S. at 223 (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (noting this disparity).
125. See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 214.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(noting inconsistency within the D.C. Circuit and among circuit courts
generally).
127. Helgason, supra note 77, at 262–63.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 935 (5th Cir. 1998).
129. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
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the respondents’ claim of juror bias may not reliably indicate how trial
courts ought to remedy alleged juror bias. In Olano, the Court noted
that the “mere presence of alternate jurors” during a jury’s deliberations
was not presumptively prejudicial. 130 But the Olano Court “granted
certiorari to clarify the standard for ‘plain error’ review by the courts
of appeals under [Federal] Rule [of Criminal Procedure] 52(b).”131 The
presence of alternate jurors during deliberations violated a procedural
rule requiring that deliberations not include alternate jurors. 132 But
whether that violation in turn violated the defendant’s impartial jury
guarantee was not a question presented to the Court, except as it
pertained to finding plain error.133 The Court’s decision not to “presume
prejudice for purposes of the Rule 52(b) analysis” is a far cry from a
blanket rejection of Remmer’s presumption. 134 Rather than instruct
trial courts not to presume prejudice, Olano simply did not presume
prejudice when reviewing a procedural violation for plain error.
At least one commentator has suggested that Phillips and Olano
are reconcilable with Remmer.135 She presents two theories purportedly
reconciling Phillips and Olano with Remmer.
First, she argues that Phillips merely explained that Remmer’s
presumption is available only on remand and only if the trial court does
not initially grant an evidentiary hearing.136 But this theory does not
give full effect to Remmer’s evidentiary presumption, which arises any
time extraneous contacts happen “[i]n a criminal case.”137 Nor does it
account for Remmer’s express burden on the government to prove the
contact’s harmlessness.138
Second, she argues that Olano alluded to a categorical approach—
that only certain types of extraneous contacts warrant a presumption
130. Id. at 739 (emphasis omitted) (“[T]he issue here is whether the alternates’
presence sufficed to establish remedial authority under Rule 52(b), not
whether it violated the Sixth Amendment or Due Process Clause . . . .”).
131. Id. at 731.
132. Id. at 739; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(3) (“The court must ensure
that a retained alternate does not discuss the case with anyone until that
alternate replaces a juror or is discharged. If an alternate replaces a juror
after deliberations have begun, the court must instruct the jury to begin
its deliberations anew.”).
133. Olano, 507 U.S. at 739.
134. Id. at 740.
135. Helgason, supra note 77, at 259–60.
136. Id. at 255–57.
137. Compare Remmer I, 347 U.S. at 229, with Helgason, supra note 77, at 256
(“[T]he Supreme Court could at most presume that such contact with the
jury prejudiced the defendant’s trial.”); see also generally supra, Part
I(C)(2).
138. Remmer I, 347 U.S. at 229.
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of prejudice.139 So because the presence of alternate jurors would not
likely prejudice the proceedings, Olano did not presume prejudice.140
But that theory still does not reconcile Olano with Remmer. Remmer
cast a wide net, presuming that “any private communication, contact,
or tampering directly or indirectly” was prejudicial.141 To the extent
that Olano prescribed a categorical approach, it significantly narrowed
Remmer.142
Neither Phillips nor Olano, then, is reconcilable with Remmer. But
the Supreme Court also has not explicitly overruled Remmer’s
presumption. Rather than accepting this current, unsettled state of
affairs, courts should adopt a uniform procedure when investigating
extraneous contacts involving jurors.

II. Splintered Caselaw
Others have examined how federal circuits split when applying
Remmer. 143 This section will update those examinations with recent
caselaw and add an exploration of state courts’ analyses of extraneous
contacts involving jurors. Courts have essentially adopted three approaches: (1) presuming prejudice, as Remmer instructed; (2) requiring
the defendant to prove juror bias; and (3) relying solely on judicial
discretion, rather than burdening either party to prove prejudice or
harmlessness.
A.

Extraneous Contact as Unique: Maintaining Remmer’s Presumption

Eight federal circuits144 and twenty-eight states145 expressly maintain some form of Remmer’s presumption. These jurisdictions use the
presumption to compensate for the no-impeachment rule, which
otherwise makes juror-bias evidence inadmissible.146
Many of these jurisdictions require threshold showings, which filter
out meritless claims of prejudicial extraneous contacts.147 These showings may pertain to the likelihood that the contact took place148 or the

139. Helgason, supra note 77, at 257–59.
140. Id.
141. Remmer I, 347 U.S. at 229 (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. See generally Helgason, supra note 77; Kerr, supra note 108.
144. See infra Appendix A.
145. See infra Appendix B.
146. See In re Hamilton, 975 P.2d 600, 612–13 (Cal. 1999).
147. See, e.g., Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1180 (11th Cir. 2010) (requiring a
“colorable showing” that extraneous contact took place).
148. E.g., id.
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likelihood that the contact would have prejudiced a juror. 149 Some
jurisdictions establish clear evidentiary standards that apply to
threshold showings—for example, requiring the defendant to prove by
preponderance of the evidence that a juror was exposed to potentially
prejudicial evidence.150 Others have much vaguer requirements, such as
requiring the defendant to “demonstrate” 151 or “show” 152 such an
exposure without articulating any evidentiary standards. These unclear
requirements leave trial courts with little guidance about when they
should presume prejudice—and in turn leave defendants without the
uniform impartial-jury guarantee that the Sixth Amendment and its
incorporation demand.
Other jurisdictions condition the availability on the circumstance’s
perceived severity. That is, the likelihood that the alleged extraneous
contact would bias a juror rather than the likelihood that the contact
occurred.153 Among jurisdictions that require defendants to show that
the extraneous contact had a tendency to bias, some reserve the
presumption only for particularly egregious circumstances.154 But these
jurisdictions rarely concretely define which circumstances merit the
presumption, effectively granting trial courts broad discretion over
when to presume prejudice.155 To counteract courts’ concern for judicial
resources156—which may incentivize them to exercise their discretion to
avoid retrying cases—something more than this vague guidance is
necessary.

149. E.g., Godoy v. Spearman, 861 F.3d 956, 968 (9th Cir. 2017) (requiring
defendant to “demonstrate a credible risk” that the extraneous contact
biased the juror).
150. E.g., Wahl v. State, 51 N.E.3d 113, 115 (Ind. 2016); State v. Scott, 20041312921, p. 71–72 (La. 1/19/06); 921 So. 2d 904, 952.
151. State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641, 651 (Tenn. 2013).
152. State v. Abdi, 2012 VT 4, ¶ 13, 191 Vt. 162, 45 A.3d 29.
153. Compare, e.g., Wahl, 51 N.E.3d at 115 (requiring that the defendant prove
that extrajudicial contact pertaining to the case occurred), with Conyers
v. Commonwealth, 530 S.W.3d 413, 428 (Ky. 2017) (presuming prejudice
only in extreme circumstances).
154. E.g., United States v. Pagán-Romero, 894 F.3d 441, 447 (1st Cir. 2018)
(“It is now well established that less serious instances of potential taint
should be addressed using the abuse-of-discretion standard, with the presumption of prejudice being reserved for more serious instances.”); Barnes
v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 245 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that the Remmer
presumption is only available when the contact is “more than innocuous”).
155. See, e.g., Pagán-Romero, 894 F.3d at 447–48 (giving examples, but no test,
for what extraneous information merited the presumption of prejudice).
156. See supra notes 100–07 and accompanying text.
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Unlike the eight circuits that expressly maintain Remmer’s
presumption, the Fifth Circuit nominally rejects it. 157 In practice,
however, the Fifth Circuit effectively preserved the presumption but
imposed a particularly vague threshold requirement. Most recently, in
United States v. Jordan,158 the court noted that “[t]o be entitled to a
new trial based on an extrinsic influence on the jury, a defendant must
first show that the extrinsic influence likely caused prejudice.”159 The
burden then shifts to the government to show that “there is ‘no
reasonable possibility’” of jury bias.160
This approach effectively aligns the Fifth Circuit with jurisdictions
that maintain Remmer’s presumption but impose a threshold-showing
requirement. Jordan’s approach closely resembles the Ninth Circuit’s
approach in Godoy v. Spearman.161 The Godoy court explained that,
after showing that an extraneous contact created a “credible risk of
influencing the verdict,” Remmer’s presumption places the burdens of
production and persuasion on the government to show that the contact
did not cause bias. 162 So while the Fifth Circuit claims to have
“rejected” Remmer’s presumption in response to Phillips and Olano,163
its post-Olano procedure functions indistinguishably from circuits that
have added a threshold requirement to Remmer’s presumption.164
Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ tests exemplify how vague these
threshold requirements often are. It is unclear, for example, what
“likely” means to the Fifth Circuit—reasonable interpretations might
include “more likely than not” or “plausibly.” Nor does the Ninth
Circuit explain clearly what amounts to a “credible risk.” These vague
standards give trial courts broad discretion to decide when the
157. See United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
Remmer presumption of prejudice cannot survive Phillips and Olano . . .
[instead,] the trial court must first assess the severity of the suspected
intrusion; only when the court determines that prejudice is likely should
the government be required to prove its absence.”).
158. 958 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 2020).
159. Id. at 335 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Mix, 791 F.3d 603,
608 (5th Cir. 2015)).
160. Id. (quoting Mix, 791 F.3d at 608).
161. 861 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2017).
162. Id. at 967–68 (quoting Tarango v. McDaniel, 837 F.3d 936, 947, 949 (9th
Cir. 2016)); see also supra Part I(C)(2).
163. United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 935 (5th Cir. 1998).
164. Compare Sylvester, 143 F.3d at 934 (“[T]he trial court must first assess
the severity of the suspected intrusion; only when the court determines
that prejudice is likely should the government be required to prove its
absence.”), with Godoy, 861 F.3d at 967 (“The [defendant must show that
the extraneous] contact . . . ‘raise[s] a credible risk of influencing the
verdict’ before [that contact] triggers the presumption of prejudice.”
(quoting Tarango, 837 F.3d at 947, 949)).
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threshold requirements are met. Given the strong incentives to preserve
judicial resources and efficiency, it seems unlikely that trial courts will
err towards finding prejudice.
* * *
Because the no-impeachment rule makes testimony pertaining to
jury deliberations inadmissible, many jurisdictions have preserved
Remmer’s presumption. But following the Supreme Court’s shift
towards judicial efficiency, many have struck a balance between the
impartial-jury guarantee and efficiency by requiring defendants to make
a threshold showing. While a prudent Remmer procedure should
include a threshold requirement to filter out clearly innocuous
extraneous contacts, the procedure should clearly state (1) what sort of
extraneous contacts require an evidentiary hearing and (2) the
evidentiary standard required to prove that the contact was of that
nature. Clarifying which standards are necessary would ensure uniform
application of Remmer by limiting judicial discretion.
B.

Extraneous Contacts as Juror Misconduct: No Presumption
Available

Some have characterized the Sixth Circuit as standing alone in
rejecting Remmer’s presumption entirely. 165 In United States v.
Pennell, 166 the Sixth Circuit held that Phillips abrogated Remmer,
leaving only its requirement that a district court hold an evidentiary
hearing when a defendant alleges jury partiality.167 “In light of Phillips,”
the court reasoned, “the burden of proof rests upon [the] defendant . . . . Prejudice is not to be presumed.”168 Pennell therefore interpreted Phillips as an unqualified rejection of Remmer’s presumption.
But the Sixth Circuit may not stand alone after all. The Tenth
Circuit appears to have rejected Remmer’s presumption in United
States v. Barrett.169 The Barrett court quoted Remmer’s presumption
but went on to note that the Tenth Circuit had “qualified” that presumption.170 “The defendant must . . . demonstrate ‘that an unauthorized contact created actual juror bias; courts should not presume that
a contact was prejudicial.’”171 The Tenth Circuit therefore does more
165. E.g., Kerr, supra note 108.
166. 737 F.2d 521 (1984).
167. Id. at 532.
168. Id. The Pennell court stated in a footnote that “Phillips worked a
substantive change in the law.” Id. at 532 n.10.
169. 496 F.3d 1079 (10th Cir. 2007).
170. Id. at 1102.
171. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Robertson, 473 F.3d 1289,
1294 (10th Cir. 2007)). Notably, the Robertson court in turn quoted
United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 377 (6th Cir. 1997). So it seems that
the Tenth Circuit has adopted the Sixth Circuit’s post-Phillips approach.
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than “qualify” Remmer’s presumption—it joins the Sixth Circuit in
entirely rejecting it.
Fifteen states also either reject or question the continued vitality of
Remmer’s presumption of prejudice when extraneous contact is
alleged.172
Frequently, jurisdictions that reject Remmer’s presumption do not
distinguish between extraneous contact involving jurors and juror
misconduct.173 The commingling of juror-misconduct and extraneouscontact jurisprudence likely explains why some jurisdictions do not
presume prejudice.174 That is, even jurisdictions that preserve Remmer’s
presumption generally do not presume that internal juror misconduct—
misconduct that clearly did not involve third parties—is prejudicial.175
It follows that jurisdictions categorizing and evaluating extraneous
contact as a form of juror misconduct would reject Remmer’s presumption.
There is admittedly some logic to treating extraneous contacts as
juror misconduct. Extraneous contacts may themselves constitute juror
misconduct when jurors initiate the extraneous contact.176 A prudent
Remmer procedure must fit both juror-initiated extraneous contact and
third-party-initiated extraneous contact. But as will be discussed in
Part III, it does not follow that a juror who engages in misconduct by
initiating extraneous contact is not presumptively biased, while a juror
contacted by a third party or unwillingly exposed to extraneous information is presumptively biased. If any distinction is appropriate, the
172. See infra Appendix B.
173. E.g., United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2008)
(characterizing a juror conducting internet research as “juror misconduct”
rather than exposure to extraneous information); Finch v. State, 2018
Ark. 111, at 7–8 & n.4, 542 S.W.3d 143, 147 & n.4 (same); State v.
Christensen, 929 N.W.2d 646, 661 (Iowa 2019) (“Juror misconduct often
involves communication by a juror with others about the case outside the
jury room, independently investigating the crime, or engaging in independent research on questions of law or fact.”), reh’g denied (July 15,
2019). Contra Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 223 (1982) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“[Remmer I], on which the Court heavily relies, involved not
juror misconduct, but the misconduct of a third party who attempted to
bribe a juror.”).
174. E.g., State v. Anderson, 134 A.3d 741, 746–47 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016)
(noting that both extraneous contact and internal misconduct are forms
of juror misconduct).
175. E.g., id. at 747 (noting that extraneous contact is presumptively
prejudicial, while internal misconduct is not); cf. Tanner v. United States,
483 U.S. 107, 125 (1987) (refusing to require an evidentiary hearing to
investigate alleged internal juror misconduct).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 639 (4th Cir. 2012)
(examining juror research as an extraneous contact); see also Gershman,
supra note 2, at 323 (describing exposure to extraneous information as
juror misconduct).
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presumption of bias ought to be even stronger when the juror initiates
extraneous contact.177
* * *
Jurisdictions that do not employ Remmer’s presumption have
either interpreted Phillips and Olano as abrogating that presumption
or analyzed extraneous contacts as juror misconduct. But because these
jurisdictions burden defendants to show bias—and prohibit testimony
that would prove that the deliberations were tainted—they do not
adequately protect the impartial-jury guarantee.
C.

Extraneous Contacts as Indistinct from Other Causes for Mistrials:
Judicial Discretion

The Eighth Circuit178 and seven states179 do not place the burden of
proof on either the defendant or the government. Instead, these
jurisdictions bestow the trial court with discretion to find facts,
determine prejudice, and grant or deny a new trial. These jurisdictions
generally do not differentiate extraneous contact involving a juror from
any other reason to declare a mistrial.180 They instead rely on the trial
court’s ability to root out juror bias and determine whether a mistrial
is warranted.181
By adopting a judicial-discretion approach, the Eighth Circuit has,
over the last decade, implicitly rejected Remmer’s presumption.182 But
unlike the Sixth Circuit, it does not place the burden on the defendant
to prove prejudice.183 Instead, district courts in the Eighth Circuit have
broad discretion to determine what the extraneous contact was, how it

177. See infra Part III(A).
178. See infra Appendix A.
179. See infra Appendix B.
180. See, e.g., State v Taylor, 669 S.E.2d 239, 260 (N.C. 2008).
181. Id.; People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701, 704 (N.Y. 2000).
182. Compare United States v. Hall, 877 F.3d 800, 805–06 (8th Cir. 2017)
(requiring trial courts to determine whether any “incident that may have
improperly influenced the jury . . . ‘affect[ed] the jury’s deliberations
and thereby its verdict’” (quoting United States v. Honken, 541 F.3d 1146,
1167 (8th Cir. 2008))), with United States v. Wallingford, 82 F.3d 278,
281 (8th Cir. 1996) (preserving the presumption in cases where the
extraneous information related to “factual evidence not developed at trial”
(quoting United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 1995))),
and Blumeyer, 62 F.3d at 1017 (8th Cir. 1995) (“When an extrinsic
contact relates to legal issues, the presumption of prejudice does not
apply, and it is the defendant’s burden to produce evidence not barred by
Rule 606(b) that is sufficient to prove the actual prejudice necessary to
justify a new trial.” (citation omitted)). See also United States v. Lawson,
677 F.3d 629, 643 (4th Cir. 2012) (including the Eighth Circuit as one
that does not apply Remmer’s presumption).
183. Hall, 877 F.3d at 805–06.
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affected the jury’s deliberations, and whether or not a new trial is
warranted.184
The Eighth Circuit’s approach is exemplified in United States v.
Harris-Thompson.185 There, the defendant moved for a mistrial after
jurors reported that they had spoken with people who may have been
the defendant’s family.186 The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s
decision to deny the defendant’s motion.187 The Harris-Thompson panel
deferred to the district court’s inquiry into the extraneous contact’s
likelihood and severity in light of the trial judge’s “advantages of close
observation of the jurors and intimate familiarity with the issues at
trial.”188
The primary advantage of leaving mistrials up to the discretion of
the trial court is that it is a highly flexible approach—and can therefore
address a wide range of circumstances involving extraneous contact
involving jurors.189 But what this approach offers in flexibility, it lacks
in concrete protections for criminal defendants. Without any consistently applicable principles, allowing individual judges to make ad hoc
decisions may create disparate outcomes between similarly situated
defendants. Moreover, courts are loath to declare a mistrial, often
emphasizing concern for judicial resources.190 Leaving the decision of
whether a mistrial is warranted to the trial court’s sole discretion therefore does not provide adequate safeguards for defendants’ impartialjury guarantee.
* * *
In sum, the patchwork solutions adopted by circuit and state courts
provide inconsistent—and therefore constitutionally unacceptable—
protections for defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury. 191 A uniform, administrable Remmer procedure is needed to
guarantee an impartial jury, while giving due consideration to the policy
concerns of judicial efficiency and juror privacy.

184. Id.
185. 751 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2014).
186. Id. at 594–95.
187. Id. at 594, 598.
188. Id. at 598 (quoting United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566, 568 (8th
Cir. 1988)).
189. People
v.
Maragh,
729
N.E.2d
701,
704
(N.Y.
2000)
(“[B]ecause juror misconduct can take many forms, no ironclad rule of
decision is possible.” (quoting People v. Brown, 399 N.E.2d 51, 53 (N.Y.
1979))).
190. See supra notes 100–07 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
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III. A Proposed Practical Solution
Because extraneous contacts may take myriad forms, adopting a
one-size-fits-all Remmer procedure may be difficult. Indeed, several
jurisdictions have declined to provide any guidance at all to the trial
court—leaving whether to grant a new trial entirely up to its discretion.
But that approach fails to account for—and counterbalance—trial
courts’ interest in judicial efficiency.192 The considerable public-resource
outlay, which prolonged criminal trials require, means that courts may
tend towards preserving a verdict rather than perfecting a trial.193 So
while a bright-line rule may be inapposite, clear guidance is necessary
to preserve a defendant’s Sixth Amendment impartial-jury guarantee,
while accounting for judicial efficiency and the no-impeachment rule.
A.

Resolving the Overlap of Extraneous Contact and Misconduct

Part II demonstrated that whether a jurisdiction characterizes
extraneous contact as juror misconduct corresponds with whether it
maintains Remmer’s presumption. Preserving Remmer’s presumption
requires parsing the difference between extraneous contact and purely
internal juror misconduct, which may be easier said than done. A Venn
diagram helps illustrate the difficulty. Circle A encompasses all extraneous contacts involving jurors and Circle B encompasses all juror misconduct. Juror tampering as contemplated by federal juror-tampering
statutes is exclusively in A.194 Because the juror did not initiate the
contact, no juror misconduct has occurred. Internal juror misconduct—
such drug and alcohol consumption195—is solely within Circle B.196 The
remaining question, then, is what to do where these categories overlap.
A procedure that presumes juror bias when extraneous contact occurs
must determine whether juror-initiated extraneous contact—which is
both a form of juror misconduct and an extraneous contact—also
triggers that presumption.

192. See supra Part I(D)(3).
193. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
194. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (criminalizing “corruptly, or by threats or force, or by
any threatening letter or communication, endeavor[ing] to influence,
intimidate, or impede any . . . juror”); 18 U.S.C. § 1504 (criminalizing
“attempt[ing] to influence the action or decision of any . . . juror . . . upon
any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which
he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him
any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter”).
195. See United States v. Tanner 483 U.S. 107, 118–19 (1987).
196. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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Extraneous
Contacts (A)

Juror
Misconduct (B)

On one hand, it seems incongruous to presume bias when a juror is
approached by a third party, 197 but not presume bias when a juror
initiates the extraneous contact.198 After all, both may expose a juror
to biasing influences. And the no-impeachment rule prohibits jurors
from testifying about the effects either has on jury deliberations. Yet it
seems similarly incongruous to presume bias when, for example, a juror
initiates an extraneous contact through internet research, 199 but not
presume bias when jurors engage in other misconduct that may seem
on its face more egregious—such as drug or alcohol abuse,200 falling
asleep during trial,201 or conducting improper experiments during deliberations.202 Both call into question the jury’s ability and willingness to
base its verdict solely on the trial record.203
Of the two, this latter incongruity is more acceptable. Courts have
consistently distinguished between internal and external influences—
permitting jurors to testify only about external influences on their
deliberations.204 Precedent therefore supports remedying juror-initiated
extraneous contacts in the same way as third-party-initiated extraneous
contacts—that is, by presuming bias.

197. E.g., Remmer I, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).
198. E.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982).
199. See United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 639, 646 (4th Cir. 2012)
(applying the Remmer presumption to a juror who “research[ed] on Wikipedia the term ‘sponsor,’ an element of the crimes charged”).
200. E.g., Tanner, 483 U.S. at 122.
201. E.g., United States v. Hui, 64 F. App’x 264, 265 (2d Cir. 2003).
202. E.g., Simon v. Kuhlman, 549 F. Supp. 1202, 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(holding that no new trial was required when jurors tested how difficult
it is to identify a person wearing a nylon stocking over her face).
203. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 217; see also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961)
(requiring jurors to “render a verdict based on the evidence presented in
court”).
204. See supra notes 91–94 (discussing this distinction).
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Moreover, juror-initiated extraneous contacts have just as much
potential to bias the juror as third-party-initiated extraneous contacts.
For a rather extreme example, compare I.J. Smith—the contacted juror
in Remmer—with George Pape—a juror for a racketeering trial of the
infamous mobster John Gotti.205 Unlike Smith—who received a bribe
offer—Pape sought out Gotti’s associates, and offered to sell Gotti his
vote. 206 Pape was later prosecuted and convicted of obstructing
justice.207 Pape’s offer to sell his vote was both juror misconduct and
extraneous contact.
The jury acquitted Gotti,208 so he had no need to appeal the verdict.
But had the jury convicted him, the no-impeachment rule would have
made it impossible to determine whether Pape had based his vote on
Gotti’s associates’ agreeing or refusing to pay a bribe rather than on
the facts in front of him. Nor could the court have considered evidence
of whether Pape’s bias had affected other jurors’ deliberations. 209 A
Remmer presumption would therefore have protected Gotti’s impartialjury guarantee by requiring a new trial.
A less obvious mix of juror misconduct and extraneous contacts
arises in cases when jurors independently research facts or law pertaining to the case for which they are empaneled.210 But courts should
still apply Remmer’s presumption, since those contacts still have the
potential to expose jurors to extrajudicial information.211 Because both
may bias a juror, courts should not distinguish between juror-initiated
extraneous contact and third-party-initiated extraneous contact.
Additionally, distinguishing between jurors who consult secondary
sources and those who contact third parties is increasingly difficult in
the Internet Age. As an example, Reddit.com allows users to “post,
vote, and comment in communities organized around their interests.”212
At least one of these communities, aptly named Legal Advice, allows
users to ask questions about the law.213 Questions that users pose and

205. Arnold H. Lubasch, Juror Is Convicted of Selling Vote to Gotti, N.Y. Times
(Nov. 7, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/07/nyregion/juror-isconvicted-of-selling-vote-to-gotti.html [https://perma.cc/E2RN-4AKJ].
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See supra Part I(D)(2) (discussing the no-impeachment rule).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 639, 646 (4th Cir. 2012).
211. E.g., id. at 645.
212. About, Reddit, https://www.redditinc.com [https://perma.cc/U4W6M5FT] (last visited Mar. 27, 2021).
213. See LegalAdvice, Reddit, https://www.reddit.com/r/legaladvice/ [https://
perma.cc/LFB8-2ZGZ] (last visited Mar. 27, 2021).
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responses to those questions are publicly viewable—and the community’s rules require that users not delete those questions after they receive
a satisfactory answer.214 As those rules put it: “This is a resource for
everyone, and your post may help others in the future.”215 The Legal
Advice Reddit community is therefore one example of both a thirdparty-authored secondary source of legal information and a platform
that could facilitate direct communication between jurors and third
parties. An attempt to distinguish between juror-initiated research and
juror-initiated communication would therefore be fruitless. And the
policy concern that extraneous contacts will affect a juror’s ability to
deliberate impartially is equally salient whether that contact comes
from viewing a pre-existing resource or communicating with a third
party.216
Moreover, when a juror seeks extraneous information about the
case, he manifests his unwillingness or inability to follow the trial
court’s instructions—instructions that are crucial to ensure an impartial
jury. 217 For example, courts routinely instruct juries not to conduct
their own internet research on the facts and law of the case for which
they are empaneled.218 The Supreme Court interprets the impartial jury
guarantee as requiring “a jury [to be] capable and willing to decide the
case solely on the evidence before it.”219 Jurors who cannot be trusted
to abstain from internet legal research are therefore not the impartial,
unbiased jurors the Sixth Amendment demands. These same concerns
arise when jurors seek a third party’s opinion about the case.220
A workable Remmer analytical framework should therefore
reconcile the disparate approaches of juror misconduct and extraneous
contact by drawing the line at exposure to extraneous contacts—
regardless of who initiates the contact. While courts may someday find

214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.
217. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017) (noting that
“fair and impartial verdicts can be reached if the jury follows the court’s
instructions”).
218. Ahunanya Anga, Jury Misconduct: Can Courts Enforce a Social Media
and Internet Free Process? We “Tweet,” Not, 18 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y
265, 277–78 (2013).
219. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (emphasis added).
220. See Godoy v. Spearman, 861 F.3d 956, 966 (9th Cir. 2017) (evaluating a
claim of juror bias when a juror communicated with her friend—a judge—
about the trial throughout the proceedings); United States v. Lanier, 870
F.3d 546, 548 (6th Cir. 2017) (evaluating a claim of juror bias when a
juror called her friend—an assistant district attorney—regarding a
“problem” with jury deliberations).
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it prudent to presume bias for allegations of internal juror misconduct
as well,221 that discussion is beyond the scope of this Note.
B.

A Uniform Procedure

Courts need a workable procedure to determine whether to presume
an extraneous contact is prejudicial. This section draws on the most
prudent and constitutional approaches adopted by state and federal
courts to propose a procedure that acknowledges that a perfect trial is
impossible, while protecting defendants’ fundamental right to an impartial jury.
1.

Court-Initiated Hearings

Although some jurisdictions require a defendant to move for a new
trial in order to qualify for an evidentiary hearing,222 the better practice
is for the court to investigate sua sponte when it becomes aware of
potential extraneous contacts with jurors.223 Information about extraneous contacts is frequently revealed directly to the trial judge. 224
Indeed, in Remmer, the defendant was not even informed of the extraneous contact and subsequent FBI investigation until after the trial
when newspapers reported the events. 225 The burden to initiate the
hearing should therefore not fall on the defendant—but the defendant
should still be permitted to initiate the hearing by informing the judge
of extraneous contact with jurors of which the defendant is aware.
2.

Triggering the Presumption

Remmer’s presumption should not completely yield to judicial
efficiency. But a threshold requirement to prevent defendants from
abusing Remmer hearings is prudent. Under the proposed procedure, a
defendant would be required to present evidence amounting to probable
cause that (1) an extraneous contact with a juror took place, (2) the
juror initiated the contact, or a third party initiated the sort of contact
that might bias a reasonable juror,226 and (3) the contact was not clearly
irrelevant to the matter for which the juror is empaneled.

221. This is not a completely outlandish possibility. Consider Peña-Rodriguez,
137 S. Ct. at 869, in which the Court carved out an exception to the noimpeachment rule when a juror manifests racial bias. It may be prudent
to presume bias once those manifestations come to light.
222. E.g., Wahl v. State, 51 N.E.3d 113, 115 (Ind. 2016).
223. E.g., State v. Berrios, 129 A.3d 696, 704 (Conn. 2016).
224. E.g., Lanier, 870 F.3d at 548 (noting that the third party with whom the
juror had extraneous contact was the party who revealed that contact to
the district judge).
225. Transcript of Record, supra note 41, at 4.
226. Cf. Godoy v. Spearman, 861 F.3d 956, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2017).
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A defendant’s burden to trigger the presumption should not be an
onerous one.227 Probable cause is a low bar—and one with which courts
are already familiar. But requiring a threshold showing preserves
judicial resources by screening out entirely meritless and unscrupulous
claims of juror bias.228 And the threshold may be overcome as a matter
of course by the information that prompted the trial judge to initiate
proceedings. Once the defendant has satisfied this initial requirement,
the burdens of proof and persuasion shift to the government.
Although the first and third elements are relatively selfexplanatory, the second element warrants some elaboration to provide
the clear guidance that current procedures lack. If the defendant can
show probable cause that a juror sought out the extraneous contact,
the court should presume prejudice. 229 But jurors’ relevant internet
histories, phone records, and text messages may suffice to rebut the
presumption if they prove that the contact was harmless.230
Further, courts must determine what sort of contact might bias a
reasonable juror. As an obvious example, if the extraneous contact with
a third party fulfills the elements of juror-tampering statutes,231 the
contact is presumptively prejudicial. Remmer’s presumption was
originally intended to remedy a juror-tampering attempt.232 Even if a
juror is unreceptive or resistant to a tampering attempt, that is no
guarantee that he will not be “disturbed” or “troubled” by the
attempt—and therefore unable to freely deliberate as though nothing
had happened.233 Requiring a presumption in instances of jury tampering is therefore a plain application of Remmer.
Courts should also presume prejudice when the extraneous contact
is between “witnesses, attorneys[,] or court personnel and jurors.”234
One of the earliest cases regarding extraneous contacts involving jurors
arose in part out of a bailiff’s comments to jurors.235 When extraneous
contacts take place between jurors and parties involved in the proceed-

227. Id. at 968.
228. One such claim arose in United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346 (6th Cir.
1997). A juror left deliberations to lie down in a deputy court clerk’s office
after experiencing chest pains. Id. at 376. Without more, the defendant
speculated that the juror had been exposed to extraneous influence and
requested a Remmer hearing. Id.
229. See supra Part III(A).
230. See United States v. Lanier, 988 F.3d 284, 290 (6th Cir. 2021).
231. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
232. Remmer I, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).
233. Remmer II, 350 U.S. 377, 381–82 (1956).
234. State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ¶ 51, 108 P.3d 730 (emphasis omitted).
235. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 142 (1892).
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ings, presuming bias serves two purposes. Not only does the presumption protect the defendant against the difficulty of proving bias, but it
also protects the integrity of the judicial system. 236 As the Utah
Supreme Court said, when the extraneous contact is between jurors and
others involved in the proceedings, “it is probable that a doubt must
and will continue to exist in the mind of the losing party and that of
his friends as to whether or not he had a fair trial.” 237 To ensure
defendants’ and the public’s trust in the judicial system, therefore, these
contacts should trigger the Remmer presumption.
Under the proposed procedure, courts need not apply Remmer’s
presumption if a third party makes a cursory inquiry into the juror’s
experience unrelated to the matter for which the juror is empaneled. A
third party would not trigger the presumption by asking a juror, for
example, whether being empaneled on a jury is an interesting experience—because that sort of question is not the sort of contact that
might bias a reasonable juror.
Nor does that sort of conversation touch on the matter for which
the juror is empaneled—it is clearly irrelevant. This is a lower bar than
the one employed by jurisdictions requiring that the contact “pertain[]”
to the proceedings.238 Extraneous contacts may sometimes be ambiguous. Because the government is in a better position to fully investigate
the extraneous contact,239 an ambiguous contact that is not obviously
unrelated to the case should trigger the presumption of prejudice.
Finally, while trial courts should not have discretion to deny
defendants Remmer’s presumption in the circumstances outlined
above,240 they should have discretion to impose a presumption in the
interest of justice in circumstances that do not otherwise meet the
above requirements.
3.

Rebutting the Presumption

To rebut the presumption of juror bias, the proposed procedure
would require the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the extraneous contact would not have prejudiced a hypothetical

236. State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985) (noting that these contacts
have a “deleterious effect upon the judicial process”).
237. Id. (quoting Glazier v. Cram, 267 P. 188, 190 (Utah 1928)).
238. E.g., Wahl v. State, 51 N.E.3d 113, 115 (Ind. 2016); accord State v.
Coburn, 1999 ME 28, ¶ 7, 724 A.2d 1239, 1241–42 (Me. 1999).
239. Cf. Remmer II, 350 U.S. 377, 378–79 (1956) (describing the FBI’s
investigation into Slattery’s comments to Smith).
240. See supra Part II(C) (explaining that additional safeguards are necessary
to counterbalance the judicial preference for efficiency).
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reasonable juror. 241 Beyond a reasonable doubt is an evidentiary
standard with which trial courts are already familiar. And adopting a
specific evidentiary standard provides the clear guidance that existing
jurisdictions often lack.242 Because at stake is the validity of a trial that
may revoke a defendant’s liberty, beyond a reasonable doubt is the
appropriate standard.243
Concerns about juror self-assessment have led many jurisdictions—
regardless of whether they presume bias or not—to adopt a
hypothetical-reasonable-juror standard when determining whether an
extraneous contact likely biased a juror. 244 This Note proposes that
every jurisdiction adopt this objective standard.
An objective, hypothetical-reasonable-juror standard is more
administrable than a subjective, actual-bias one. Although some
jurisdictions inquire into actual bias,245 the no-impeachment rule leaves
the court to take the juror at her word that she was not biased.246 But
one recent study found that “jurors completely fail[] to self-diagnose
bias.”247 Juror testimony is therefore at best weakly probative for the
purpose of disproving actual bias.248 But while the trial court need not
inquire into actual bias, a juror’s subjective belief that she was biased
is still very probative—if not dispositive—of the extraneous contact’s

241. Massachusetts follows this approach. Once the defendant makes a
threshold showing, “the burden shifts to the Commonwealth to demonstrate ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the defendant was not prejudiced
by the extraneous matters. ‘The judge . . . must focus on the probable
effect of the extraneous facts on a hypothetical average jury.’” Commonwealth
v. Guisti, 747 N.E.2d 673, 680 (Mass. 2001) (citation omitted) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Fidler, 385 N.E.2d 513, 519 (Mass. 1979)).
242. E.g., State v. Needelman, 276 So. 3d 444, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)
(noting that the government “must demonstrate that the error was harmless”
without providing an applicable evidentiary standard (quoting Williamson
v. State, 894 So. 2d 996, 998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005))).
243. See generally Note, Reasonable Doubt: An Argument Against Definition,
108 Harv. L. Rev. 1955 (1995).
244. E.g., State v. Broomfield, 589 N.W.2d 225, 231 (Wis. 1999) (requiring
defendants to show that the contact would have biased a hypothetical
reasonable juror); Guisti, 747 N.E.2d at 680 (requiring the government to
show that the contact would not have biased a hypothetical reasonable
juror to rebut a presumption of prejudice).
245. E.g., State v. Jenner, 780 S.E.2d 762, 774 (W.Va. 2015) (requiring the
defendant to “prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that improper
influence on a juror occurred and affected the verdict”).
246. See supra Part I(D)(2) (discussing Rule 606(b) and the no-impeachment
rule).
247. Yokum, supra note 98, at 913.
248. Id.
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effect on a hypothetical reasonable juror. 249 The objective standard
therefore still takes into account the juror’s subjective state of mind.
Concededly, requiring the government to rebut the presumption
beyond a reasonable doubt is a heavy burden. But a heavy burden on
the government is precisely what Remmer prescribed. 250 Moreover,
while testimony regarding the contact’s impact on the jury’s deliberations and verdict is inadmissible because of the no-impeachment rule,
information about the contact itself is exempt from that rule. Trial
courts may compel jurors to produce text messages and web browsing
histories251 and interview third parties with whom jurors communicated,252 thereby making that information available to the government. If
necessary, the government may work with law enforcement to investigate the extraneous contact.253 If the extraneous contact would not have
biased a hypothetical reasonable juror, these evidentiary sources should
be sufficient to prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
A full discussion of the proper remedy when juror bias is found is
beyond the scope of this Note. However, courts have noted that a biased
juror may warrant a mistrial.254 Other jurisdictions look to factors such
as the timing of the contact255 or the efficacy of curative measures256
when considering mistrial motions that allege extraneous juror contacts.
While the proper remedy is likely a mistrial, this Note leaves open
249. If a juror was biased by contact that would not have biased a reasonable
juror, she is therefore not a reasonable juror—which violates the impartialjury guarantee. Cf. People v. Kurth, 216 N.E.2d 154, 156 (Ill. 1966)
(noting that a claustrophobic juror’s deliberation may be “influenced by
her fear of confinement” and that therefore “the possibility of prejudice is
high”); Pace v. State, 524 S.E.2d 490, 500 (Ga. 1999) (holding that the
trial court properly excused a juror prone to anxiety attacks).
250. Remmer I, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (“[T]he burden rests heavily upon
the Government to establish . . . that such contact with the juror was
harmless to the defendant.”).
251. See United States v. Lanier, 988 F.3d 284, 290 (6th Cir. 2021) (describing
the trial judge requiring a juror suspected of internet research and thirdparty contacts to preserve and produce her web browsing history and text
messages).
252. See Reporter’s Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing Day 3 at 35, Godoy v.
Uribe, 2013 WL 2121440 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2013) (No. CV 10-7927-R)
(interviewing a third-party judge with whom the juror communicated
regarding the trial).
253. See, e.g., Remmer II, 350 U.S. 377, 381 (1956) (describing the FBI investigation into allegations of jury tampering).
254. E.g., Hatten v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 595, 600 (5th Cir. 2009); see also
Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 944 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that “even
a single biased juror” violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury (citing Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992))).
255. E.g., Bowman v. State, 387 P.3d 202, 205–06 (Nev. 2016).
256. E.g., State v. Erickson, 610 N.W.2d 335, 338–39 (Minn. 2000).

496

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 2·2021
Iceberg Ahead

whether excusing a biased juror before or during deliberation is a
sufficient safeguard to a defendant’s impartial-jury guarantee, and what
prophylactic measures a trial court might take—such as admonishing
or sequestering jurors—to prevent extraneous contacts in the first place.

Conclusion
To ensure that the Sixth Amendment’s impartial-jury guarantee is
equally available to all defendants, courts must respond to extraneous
contacts uniformly. A careful analysis of Remmer and its underlying
policies demonstrates that courts should presume that a juror is biased
when she is involved in extraneous contacts that might bias an
objective, reasonable juror. This presumption is necessitated by the noimpeachment rule, which restricts the available evidence to whether
extraneous contact took place—the tip of the iceberg. The proposed
procedure would keep defendants’ impartial-jury guarantee afloat
without wholly sacrificing judicial efficiency. While there may still be
close calls and opportunities for judges to exercise individual discretion
within this procedure, the proposed measures would ensure that the
fundamental right to an impartial jury is equally guaranteed to every
defendant.
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Appendix A

Circuit Survey
Jurisdiction
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
D.C. Circuit

Presumes
Prejudice

Burdens
Defendant

Judicial
Discretion

X257
X258
X259
X260
X261
X262
X263
X264
X

265

X266
267

X
X268

257. United States v. Pagán-Romero, 894 F.3d 441, 447 (1st Cir. 2018) (“It is
now well established that less serious instances of potential taint should
be addressed using the abuse-of-discretion standard, with the presumption
of prejudice being reserved for more serious instances.”).
258. United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2002) (“It is well-settled
that any extra-record information of which a juror becomes aware is presumed prejudicial.”).
259. United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 299 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[A]ny private
communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror
during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is . . . deemed
presumptively prejudicial.” (quoting United States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256,
266 (3d Cir. 2002))).
260. Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 245 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that “the
Remmer presumption” is only available when the contact is “more than
innocuous” (quoting United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 141 (4th Cir.
1996))).
261. See supra notes 157–64 and accompanying text.
262. United States v. Lanier, 988 F.3d 284, 295 & n.13 (6th Cir. 2021) (noting
that the Sixth Circuit “places on the defendant the burden of proving bias
at the Remmer hearing”).
263. United States v. Turner, 836 F.3d 849, 867 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[I]n a
criminal case, any private communication . . . with a juror during a trial
about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed
presumptively prejudicial.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v.
Bishawi, 272 F.3d 458, 462 (7th Cir. 2001))).
264. United States v. Hall, 877 F.3d 800, 806 (8th Cir. 2017) (granting the
district court “broad discretion” to detect and cure prejudice).
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265. Godoy v. Spearman, 861 F.3d 956, 968 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Once a defendant
shows a possibly prejudicial contact, the presumption of prejudice attaches,
and the burden shifts to the state to prove the contact was harmless.”).
266. United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he
defendant must . . . demonstrate ‘that an unauthorized contact created
actual juror bias; courts should not presume that a contact was prejudicial.’”
(quoting United States v. Robertson, 473 F.3d 1289, 1294 (10th Cir. 2007))).
267. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1180 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[E]xposure [to extraneous information] is presumptively prejudicial.”).
268. United States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting
that its cases maintain the presumption but declining to determine the
continuing strength of the presumption after Phillips and Olano).
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State Survey
Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

Presumes
Prejudice

Burdens
Defendant

Judicial
Discretion

X269
X270
X271
X272
X273
X274
275

X
X276
X277
X278
X279
X280
281

X
X282
X283
X284
X285
X286
X287
X288
289

X
X290
X291
X292
293

X
X294
X295
X296
X

297

X298
299

X

X300
X301
X302
X303
304

X

X305
X306
X307
X308
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Jurisdiction
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Presumes
Prejudice

Burdens
Defendant

Judicial
Discretion

X309
X310
X311
312

X
X313
X314
315

X

X316
X317
X318

269. Resurrection of Life, Inc. v. Dailey, 311 So. 3d 748, 757 (Ala. 2020)
(presuming prejudice when a juror is exposed to information “crucial in
resolving a key material issue in the case” (quoting Dawson v. State, 710
So.2d 472, 475 (Ala. 1997))).
270. Swain v. State, 817 P.2d 927, 931 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (requiring
“substantial likelihood” that the jury was prejudiced by extraneous information to grant a new trial), cited with approval in Titus v. State, 963
P.2d 258, 264 n.6 (Alaska 1998).
271. Am. Power Prods., Inc. v. CSK Auto, Inc., 367 P.3d 55, 59–60 (Ariz. 2016)
(“That the nature of an error may render it impossible to prove the extent
of any prejudice does not warrant a presumption of prejudice . . . . [T]he
moving party is not required to prove actual prejudice, but is required to
demonstrate the objective likelihood of prejudice.”).
272. Finch v. State, 2018 Ark. 111, at 7, 542 S.W.3d 143, 147 (“[T]he moving party
bears the burden of proving both the misconduct and that a reasonable
possibility of prejudice resulted from it.”).
273. In re Hamilton, 975 P.2d 600, 613–14 (Cal. 1999) (“[A] nonjuror’s tampering
contact or communication with a sitting juror, usually raises a rebuttable
‘presumption’ of prejudice.”), modified on reh’g denial (June 30, 1999),
cited with approval in In re Cowan, 419 P.3d 535, 544 (Cal. 2018).
274. People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616, 624 (Colo. 2005) (“[F]irst, a court makes
a determination that extraneous information was improperly before the jury;
and second, . . . makes a determination whether use of that extraneous
information posed the reasonable possibility of prejudice . . . .”).
275. State v. Berrios, 129 A.3d 696, 704 (Conn. 2016) (“We . . . agree . . . that
the Remmer presumption remains good law . . . .”).
276. Baird v. Owczarek, 93 A.3d 1222, 1228 (Del. 2014) (requiring the movant
to prove either identifiable prejudice or “egregious circumstances” meriting
the presumption of prejudice (quoting Sykes v. State, 953 A.2d 261 (Del.
2008))).
277. State v. Needelman, 276 So. 3d 444, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (“Once
it is determined that extrinsic information was made available to the jury,
‘the State has the burden of proving that there is no reasonable possibility
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of prejudice to the defendant.’” (quoting Williamson v. State, 894 So. 2d
996, 998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005))).
278. Burney v. State, 845 S.E.2d 625, 642 (Ga. 2020) (“[W]hen irregular juror
conduct is shown, there is a presumption of prejudice to the defendant . . . .” (quoting Dixon v. State, 808 S.E.2d 696, 702 (Ga. 2017))).
279. State v. Pitts, 456 P.3d 484, 496–97 (Haw. 2020) (“[A] rebuttable
presumption of prejudice is raised when the nature of an outside influence
is such that it ‘could’ substantially prejudice the defendant’s right to a
fair trial.”).
280. McCandless v. Pease, 465 P.3d 1104, 1112 (Idaho 2020) (“[T]he party
seeking a new trial must demonstrate that juror misconduct occurred”
then “the district court must determine whether there has been ‘a showing
that prejudice reasonably could have occurred.’” (quoting Levinger v.
Mercy Med. Ctr., Nampa, 75 P.3d 1202, 1206 (Idaho 2003))).
281. People v. Hobley, 696 N.E.2d 313, 341 (Ill. 1998) (“[T]he law is well
established that communications about the case between jurors and third
parties are presumptively prejudicial.”).
282. Wahl v. State, 51 N.E.3d 113, 115 (Ind. 2016) (“Defendants seeking a mistrial
for suspected jury taint are entitled to the presumption of prejudice . . . .”
(quoting Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933, 939 (Ind. 2014))).
283. State v. Christensen, 929 N.W.2d 646, 678 (Iowa 2019) (“[T]he Remmertype presumption is for ‘more than innocuous interventions.’” (quoting
Stephens v. S. Atl. Canners, Inc. (Coca Cola Co.), 848 F.2d 484, 486 (4th
Cir. 1988))), reh’g denied (July 15, 2019).
284. State v. Pruitt, 453 P.3d 313, 327 (Kan. 2019) (requiring nonmoving party
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that extrinsic contact did not affect
the trial’s outcome).
285. Conyers v. Commonwealth, 530 S.W.3d 413, 427–28 (Ky. 2017) (prescribing
a three-tiered approach that may presume prejudice only in extreme
circumstances).
286. State v. Scott, 2004-1312921, p. 71–72 (La. 1/19/06); 921 So. 2d 904, 952
(“Once the defendant has established that an extraneous influence was
present in the jury room, the burden shifts to the state, which may present
evidence to rebut the presumption of prejudice.”), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Dunn, 2007-0878, p. 7 (La. 1/25/08); 974 So. 2d 658,
662–63.
287. State v. Coburn, 1999 ME 28, ¶ 7, 724 A.2d 1239, 1241 (“When a
defendant demonstrates that a juror was subjected to extraneous information
and that the information is sufficiently related to the issues presented at
trial, a presumption of prejudice is established . . . .”).
288. Johnson v. State, 31 A.3d 239, 246 (Md. 2011) (acknowledging that, while
prejudice may be presumed in certain, unspecified situations, the trial
court can ordinarily fashion a remedy other than mistrial).
289. Commonwealth v. Guisti, 747 N.E.2d 673, 680 (Mass. 2001) (requiring
“the Commonwealth to demonstrate ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the
defendant was not prejudiced by the extraneous [contact]” (quoting
Commonwealth v. Fidler, 385 N.E.2d 513, 520 (Mass. 1979), superseded
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by rule on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Moore, 52 N.E.3d 126, 132
(Mass. 2016))).
290. People v. Rademacher, No. 258149, 2006 WL 707718, at *3 (Mich. Ct.
App. Mar. 21, 2006) (“If the defendant establishes [that extrinsic contact
occurred and that contact could have affected the verdict], the burden
shifts to the people to demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (quoting People v. Budzyn 566 N.W.2d 229, 235 (Mich.
1997))).
291. State v. Erickson, 610 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Minn. 2000) (“[P]rivate communication with a juror is presumptively prejudicial.”).
292. Rutland v. State, 2008-CT01544-SCT (¶ 24), 60 So.3d 137 (Miss. 2011)
(“The party contending the misconduct must make an adequate showing
to overcome the presumption of jury impartiality.”).
293. Smotherman v. Cass Reg’l Med. Ctr., 499 S.W.3d 709, 712 (Mo. 2016)
(en banc) (“[P]roving that a juror obtained extraneous evidence against
the court’s instructions . . . raises a presumption of prejudice . . . .”).
294. Stebner v. Associated Materials, Inc. (AMI), 2010 MT 138, ¶ 17, 356
Mont. 520, 234 P.3d 94 (“A rebuttable presumption of prejudice exists
when jury misconduct stems from extraneous influence . . . .”).
295. State v. Thorpe, 783 N.W.2d 749, 759 (Neb. 2010) (applying a nominal
“presumption” after requiring a defendant to “prov[e], by a preponderance
of the evidence, (1) the existence of jury misconduct and (2) that such
misconduct was prejudicial to the extent that the defendant was denied a
fair trial”).
296. Bowman v. State, 387 P.3d 202, 205–06 (Nev. 2016) (“[A juror’s] exposure
to extraneous information via independent research or improper experiment
is . . . unlikely to raise a presumption of prejudice.” (quoting Meyer v.
State, 80 P.3d 447, 456 (Nev. 2003))).
297. State v. Stanin, 183 A.3d 890, 895 (N.H. 2018) (“[P]rejudice is presumed
when there are communications between jurors and individuals associated
with the case or when the juror’s unauthorized communications with
others are about the case.” (quoting State v. Brown, 910 A.2d 1203, 1207
(N.H. 2006))).
298. Brandimarte v. Green, 182 A.2d 562, 565 (N.J. 1962) (“Where there are
sufficient allegations that the jury’s verdict was discolored by improper
influences, the trial judge should investigate the truth of the charges so
that he may determine whether a new trial is warranted.” (quoting State
v. Levitt, 176 A.2d 465, 467 (N.J. 1961))), cited with approval in Davis v.
Husain, 106 A.3d 438, 448 (N.J. 2014) (“An indication that jurors have
used improper information in deliberations may require an inquiry into
the information’s effect on the jury’s decision making.”).
299. Kilgore v. Fuji Heavy Indus. Ltd., 2010-NMSC-040, ¶ 22, 148 N.M. 561,
240 P.3d 648 (“[W]e hereby disavow any further reference to a
‘presumption of prejudice’ in our case law because, in practice, the burden
does not shift to the opposing party to disprove prejudice.”).
300. People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701, 704 (N.Y. 2000) (“[B]ecause juror misconduct can take many forms, no ironclad rule of decision is possible. In
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each case, the facts must be examined to determine the nature of the
material placed before the jury and the likelihood that prejudice would
be engendered.” (quoting People v. Brown, 399 N.E.2d 51, 53 (N.Y.
1979))).
301. State v. Hurst, 624 S.E.2d 309, 317 (N.C. 2006) (“[W]hen there is a
substantial reason to fear that the jury has become aware of improper and
prejudicial matters, the trial court must question the jury as to whether
such exposure has occurred and, if so, whether the exposure was prejudicial.” (quoting State v. Campbell, 460 S.E.2d 144, 156 (N.C. 1995))).
302. State v. Hidanovic, 2008 ND 66, ¶ 16, 747 N.W.2d 463, 469–70 (requiring the
nonmoving party to prove that extrinsic juror contact was not prejudicial).
303. State v. Herring, 762 N.E.2d 940, 955 (Ohio 2002) (“The complaining
party must show actual prejudice, i.e., he must show that the communication biased one or more jurors.” (citation omitted)).
304. Lay v. State, 2008 Ok CR 7, ¶ 16, 179 P.3d 615, 621 (presuming prejudice
when extraneous contacts take place during deliberations).
305. State v. Moore, 927 P.2d 1073, 1091 (Or. 1996) (“The decision to grant
or deny a motion for a mistrial ‘is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial judge, who is in the best position to assess and to rectify the
potential prejudice to the defendant.’” (quoting State v. Pratt, 852 P.2d
827, 835 (Or. 1993))).
306. Pratt v. St. Christopher’s Hosp., 866 A.2d 313, 317 (Pa. 2005)
(establishing a three-factor test to guide a court’s inquiry).
307. State v. Quinlan, 921 A.2d 96, 111 (R.I. 2007) (“[A] rebuttable presumption of prejudice does not arise merely because extraneous information is
placed before the jury.”).
308. State v. Harris, 530 S.E.2d 626, 628 (S.C. 2000) (“In order to receive a
mistrial, the defendant must show error and resulting prejudice.”).
309. State v. Dillon, 2010 S.D. 72, ¶ 51, 788 N.W.2d 360, 373–74 (maintaining
the presumption of prejudice, but providing a three-pronged framework
allowing the government to rebut that presumption).
310. State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641, 651 (Tenn. 2013) (“[When] the jury was
exposed to extraneous prejudicial information or an improper outside
influence, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises . . . .”).
311. Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc)
(“A defendant, to prevail on an appeal claiming reversible prejudice
resulting from external juror influence, must show either actual or
inherent prejudice.”), reh’g denied, (Mar. 19, 1997), overruled on other
grounds by Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
312. State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ¶ 51, 108 P.3d 730 (maintaining the
presumption of prejudice when the extraneous contact is between another
participant in the trial and a juror).
313. State v. Abdi, 2012 VT 4, ¶ 14, 191 Vt. 162, 45 A.3d 29 (noting the state’s
“heavy burden” when proving that extrinsic contact was not prejudicial).
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314. Riner v. Commonwealth, 601 S.E.2d 555, 567 (Va. 2004) (“[T]he party
moving for a mistrial . . . ha[s] the burden to establish that juror misconduct ‘probably resulted in prejudice.’” (quoting Robertson v. Metro.
Wash. Airport Auth., 452 S.E.2d 845, 847 (Va. 1995))).
315. In re Woods, 114 P.3d 607, 615 (Wash. 2005) (“[W]hen an unauthorized jury communication is found to have taken place, it is the State’s
burden to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.”), abrogated on
other grounds by Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006).
316. State v. Jenner, 780 S.E.2d 762, 774 (W.Va. 2015) (“During a Remmer
hearing, the person seeking a new trial must prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that improper influence on a juror occurred and affected the
verdict.”).
317. State v. Broomfield, 589 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Wis. 1999) (holding that a new
trial is not warranted when a “defendant fail[s] to prove that the jury was
biased by any improper information, or that a new trial was warranted”).
318. Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 8, 169 P.3d 512, 520 (Wyo. 2007)
(noting Remmer’s presumption of prejudice before noting that “many
courts have abandoned the ‘presumption’ mechanism in favor of common
sense inquiries into the likely effect of the information or influences on the
average juror” (quoting Gunnett v. State 104 P.3d 775, 781 (Wyo. 2005))).
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